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the-clock Stores Department at the Kansas City International Airport.
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In June 1967, Larry Hardison was hired by Trans World Airlines to
work at its vital, round-the-clock Stores Department at the Kansas City
International Airport. The job was covered by a seniority system in a
collective-bargaining agreement maintained by TWA and a labor
union.' In the spring of 1968, Hardison began to study a religion known
as the Worldwide Church of God, which requires its members to refrain
from working on certain designated holidays as well as on its Sabbath,
sundown Fridays through sundown Saturdays. In December 1968, pur-
suant to his request to be assigned to a day shift, Hardison was trans-
ferred from Building I of the Stores Department (where he had senior-
ity) to Building 2 (where he was number two from the bottom). Shortly
thereafter, he was called to substitute for a vacationing fellow employee
1. Hardison's job was subject to a collective-bargaining contract maintained by
TWA with three different unions: the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, District 142, and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, Local 1650, all of which were sued along with TWA. When the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case, it noted that, in view of its holding, the unions
could be referred to simply as "the union." Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527
F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1975). Under the seniority system, a union steward, representing all
the unions, accepted bids from employees for particular shift assignments as they be-
came available. First choice for job and shift assignments was offered to the most senior
employees, and the most junior employees were required to fill those positions and shifts
that the union steward was unable to fill through the voluntary bidding method. The
TWA-IAM agreement provided in part:
The principle of seniority shall apply in the application of this Agreement in all
reductions or increases of force, preference of shift assignment, vacation period
selection, in bidding for vacancies or new jobs, and in all promotions, demotions,
or transfers involving classifications covered by this Agreement.
0 0 0 0 0
Except as hereafter provided in this paragraph, seniority shall apply in selection
of shifts and days off within a classification within a department. . ..
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 67 & n.1 (1977).
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whose working hours included Friday evenings and Saturdays, Le.,
Hardison's Sabbath.2
Because of his recent transfer to Building 2, Hardison lacked suffi-
cient seniority to bid himself out of the substitution assignment. Subse-
quently, his superior at TWA informed the union steward that the com-
pany would be amenable to any trading of employee work schedules that
the latter could work out within the framework of the seniority system,3
provided that the accommodations did not call for payment of overtime
wages or the undermanning of any TWA operations.' Eventually,
Hardison was transferred to the twilight shift, but on his first Friday
under that schedule he left work at sundown, thereby precipitating his
discharge by TWA.5
After exhausting the administrative remedy provided by Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Hardison sued for injunctive relief, claim-
ing that his discharge constituted religious discrimination in violation
of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e-2(a) (1)' and 2000e(j) 7 and of the
2. Id. at 68.
3. Although it would seem that a viable alternative would have been merely to
reassign Hardison to Building 1 where he might have regained his seniority, such a
solution was not available. The union, pointing to the seniority system, would not
approve his early return because it would violate a rule in the agreement prohibiting
transfers twice within six months. Id. at 95 n. I1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 68-69. Justice Marshall, in his lengthy dissent, considered an important
factor that goes to the heart of this solution-searching by TWA and the union:
"[Hardison] lost the non-Sabbath shift when an employee junior to him went on vaca-
tion. The vacation was to last only two weeks, however, and the record does not explain
why respondent did not regain his shift at the end of that time." Id. at 94 n.9 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 69. Justice White, writing for the majority, questioned Hardison's failure
to'seek assistance of the Union Relief Committee which had dealt successfully in the
past with scheduling problems. Id. at 68 n.3. Finally, Justice Marshall, in his dissent,
also noted that TWA, the union, and Hardison had apparently not approached the
Union Relief Committee to approve an exemption. See text accompanying notes 103-
4, infra.
The Union Relief Committee should be distinguished from the union's grievance
committee, which did become involved in the dispute. 375 F. Supp. 877, 884 (1974).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1970), pro-
vides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1970), adopted by
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1967 Equal Employment Opportunity guidelines.' The United States
District Court ruled in favor of both the union and TWA.? The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment for the union
as Hardison had not attacked it on appeal, but reversed the judgment
for TWA.' On certiorari," the United States Supreme Court reversed
the judgment against TWA and HELD that the company had satisfied
the Act's reasonable accommodation duties; that further efforts to ac-
commodate Hardison's beliefs would have resulted in "undue hardship"
to TWA; and that an agreed-upon seniority system is not required to
yield to accommodate religious practices.' 2 By reaching this particular
decision, the Court found that it had obviated the necessity of address-
ing TWA's constitutional challenge of Title VII based on the establish-
ment of religion clause 3 and of pursuing further the union's status."
Thus, the only issue addressed by the Court was "the extent of the
Congress in its 1972 amendment to Title VII, provides:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as
well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
8. The 1967 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guideline on religious
discrimination provides:
The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds,
required by Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes an obliga-
tion on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the
religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such accommoda-
tions can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where the employee's
needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially similar
qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer. 29 C.F.R. §
1605.1(b), 32 Fed. Reg. 10,298 (July 13, 1967).
9. 375 F. Supp. 877, 891 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
10. 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
11. The Court granted both TWA's and the union's separate petitions for certio-
rari. Although the union prevailed in both of the lower federal courts, it nevertheless
filed its own petition for certiorari, contending that if the court of appeals' ruling as to
TWA were upheld, it might eventually be obligated to waive provisions in its collective-
bargaining agreement. 432 U.S. at 70-71 n.5.
12. Id. at 77-79.
13. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:
"Congress shall make no law respectirg" an establishment of religion. . . ." Both the
district court and the court of appeals ruled against TWA's argument that Title VII's
prescribed duty to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs is a violation of the
establishment clause. 375 F. Supp. at 887; 527 F.2d at 44.
14. 432 U.S. at 70-71 & n.5.
12:1978 129 1
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employer's obligation under Title VII to accommodate an employee
whose religious beliefs prohibit him from working on Saturdays. ' ' 5
In deciding the issue, the Court turned its attention to an examina-
tion of the statutory and administrative language of the Act and the
guidelines which served as the basis of Hardison's claim. With regard
to Section 703(a)(1) of the Act, which makes it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discharge an employee because of his reli-
gion, the Court noted, in its opinion," McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 7 Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,18
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,9 and Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,2"
15. Id. at 66.
16. Id. at 71 n.6.
17. 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976). In McDonald, two white employees charged
with misappropriating their employer's property were dismissed from their jobs while a
black employee, charged with the same offense, was retained. The whites brought suit
against both the employer and the union alleging that their discharge constituted dis-
crimination on the basis of race. The Court held that Title VII and § 1981 prohibited
racial discrimination in private employment against whites as well as against non-
whites.
18. 424 U.S. 747,763 (1976). The Court undoubtedly relied heavily on the Franks
dissenting opinions to support its decision in Hardison. Significantly, the dissenters in
Franks help to comprise the majority in Hardison, and, conversely, Justice Brennan,
who wrote for the majority in Franks, joins Justice Marshall in his dissent in the present
case. In Franks, the lower federal court had held that several blacks had been discrimi-
nated against by an employer's hiring practices. When the case reached the Supreme
Court, the sole issue was whether an award of retroactive seniority (as well as back pay)
was an appropriate remedy to correct that past discrimination. Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, granted that relief, even though he recognized that to do so would
implicate the seniority expectations of Bowman's other employees. Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, in their dissenting opinions protested
the inequity of permitting the retroactive seniority relief, charging that such a remedy
placed an unfair burden on "innocent employees," and afforded "preferential" treat-
ment to a minority of employees at the expense of the majority. Chief Justice Burger
accused the majority of "robbing Peter to pay Paul." Id. at 781 (Burger, J., dissenting).
19. 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). The Court in McDonnell ruled that, while Title VII
prohibits an employer from refusing to hire a qualified applicant because of his race, it
does not prohibit rejection of that same applicant if he has previously engaged in
deliberate, unlawful activity against the employer, and the employer's refusal to hire him
is based upon his participation in that activity.
20. 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). In Griggs, the Court held that Title VII prohibits
an employer from requiring a high'school education or the passing of a standardized
intelligence test as a condition of employment when neither standard relates signifi-
cantly to job capability. Although the Duke Power Company's tests appeared neutral
in terms of intent, they operated to disquafy black job applicants at a significantly higher
rate than white applicants, and implemented the employer's longstanding practice of
4
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as well as an excerpt from the Congressional Record." These cases
established that the main purpose of Title VII was to eliminate discrimi-
nation in employment and that "similarly situated employees are not
to be treated differently solely because they differ with respect to race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.""2 The Court underscored this
declaration by stating: "This is true regardless of whether the discrimi-
nation is directed against majorities or minorities. 2 3 Central to the
Court's concerns was that Title VII be applied equitably, taking into
account the impact it could have on all parties that would be affected.
In considering the 1967 EEOC guideline that requires employers
to "make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employ-
ees . . . where such accommodation can be made without undue hard-
ship on the conduct of the employer's business,"24 the Court first estab-
lished the propriety of using the guideline in its determination of the
issue. While administrative guidelines are not ordinarily entitled to great
weight, the Court singled out this one noting that Congress, wishing to
give the guideline force, ratified it by passing "positive legislation,"' '
i.e., Section 701(j),21 which adopted the specific language of the 1967
EEOC guideline. The Court pointed to the legislative history of the Act
as evidence that Congress wanted to clear away doubts left by inconclu-
sive case law? Precisely because it had found sufficient legislative in-
tent, the Court held that it would consider the guideline and Section
7010) without considering "whether Section 7010) [had to] be applied
giving preference to whites. The Court condemned the tests, calling them "fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation." Id. at 431.
21. "'[Tlhe purpose of [Title VII] is to eliminate, through the utilization of formal
and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on race, color,
religion, or national origin."' 432 U.S. at 71 n.6.
22. Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added). In making this statement, the Court relied on
the McDonald and the Griggs cases. Given the holding in Hardison, it would seem that
the Court chose to overlook its Griggs ruling that Title VII "proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). However, the discriminatory
device in Griggs was an intelligence examination which job applicants were required to
pass and not the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement.
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b), 32 Fed. Reg. 10,298 (1967). See text accompanying
note 8, supra.
25. 432 U.S. at 76 n.l.
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retroactively to the facts of this litigation.
' 28
As the Court traced the applicable statutory and administrative
language, and examined the supporting case law, it arrived with seeming
consternation at what it saw as an inescapable conclusion: "the em-
ployer's statutory obligation to make reasonable accommodation for
the religious observances of its employees, short of incurring an undue
hardship, is clear, but the reach of that obligation has never been spelled
out by Congress or by EEOC guidelines. ' 29 The Court noted that the
Commission, in proposing its 1967 guideline, "did not suggest what sort
of accommodations [were] 'reasonable' or when hardship to an em-
ployer becomes 'undue."'
3
When the Supreme Court affirmed, by an equally divided court, the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,3' the ques-
tion as to how far this accommodation should extend was left unan-
swered. The Court in Dewey affirmed the lower court's judgment be-
cause there had been a finding that the manner in which the employer
allocated his Sunday work assignments was not discriminatory either in
its purpose or in its effect. 32 Furthermore, consistent with the 1967
guidelines, the employer had fulfilled his duty to make reasonable
28. Id. at 76 n.1l.
29. Id. at 75.
30. Id. at 72.
31. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court,
402 U.S. 689 (1971). In this case, the employee, Dewey, was subject to the terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement between his union and his employer. Under the agree-
ment, employees were required to work overtime when scheduled, or, in the alternative,
to secure a replacement for themselves. When he was assigned Sunday overtime, Dewey
refused to work or to find a replacement, contending that either act would violate his
religious convictions. Following his subsequent discharge, he brought an action against
his employer, alleging religious discrimination under Title VII. The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the employee had wrongfully violated the non-discriminatory terms
of the collective-bargaining agreement so that his subsequent discharge was permissible
under Title VII.
32. 432 U.S. at 73. In a footnote to this observation, the Court in Hardison
pointed out that regardless of what the Dewey decision stated, it must be disregarded
because "[j]udgment entered by an equally divided court is not 'entitled to precedential
weight,' Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972)." 432 U.S. at 73 n.8. The impact of
Dewey is inconclusive also because (1) the case "was decided prior to the addition by
Congress to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 of§ 7010) (42 USCA § 2000e(j); and (2) the
Court held the 1966 EEOC version of 29 CFR § 1605.1 applicable, and that version of
the regulation did not require an employer to make reasonable accommodation to the
religious needs of its employees. . . ." Annot., 22 A.L.R. FED. 580, at 606 (1975).
A 4 n I
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accommodations when he provided that the employee was permitted to
secure his own replacement.3
In its discussion of the 1972 amendments to Title VII embodied in
Section 701(j), the Court lamented that, in neither the statute nor the
ample legislative history 4 backing it, was any guidance given for deter-
mining the degree of accommodation required of an employer. 5
Finally, case law appeared on both sides of the issue, providing no
clear-cut theories of decision:
In circumstances where an employer has declined to take steps that would
burden some employees in order to permit another employee or prospec-
tive employee to observe his Sabbath, the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits
have found no violation for failure to accommodate. . . .But the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits have also reached the opposite conclusion on similar
facts.3"
33. 432 U.S. at 73.
34. Id. at 74-75 n.9, which states:
The Congressional Record ...contains reprints of Dewey and Riley v.
Bendix Corp ... as well as a brief synopsis of the new provision [Section
7010)], which makes reference to Dewey, 118 Cong. Rec. 7167 (1972). The signifi-
cance of the legislative references to prior case law is unclear. In Riley the District
Court ruled that an employer who discharged an employee for refusing to work
on his Sabbath had not committed an unfair labor practice even though the
employer had not made any effort whatsoever to accommodate the employee's
religious needs. It is clear from the language of § 7010) that Congress intended
to change this result by requiring some form of accommodation; but this tells us
nothing about how much an employer must do to satisfy its statutory obligation.
The reference to Dewey is even more opaque:
"The purpose of this subsection is to provide the statutory basis for EEOC
to formulate guidelines on discrimination because of religion such as those chal-
lenged in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company, 429 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1970),
Affirmed by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971)." 118 Cong. Rec. 7167
(1972). Clearly, any suggestion in Dewey that an employer may not be required
to make reasonable accommodation for the religious needs of its employees was
disapproved by § 7016); but Congress did not indicate that "reasonable accommo-
dation" requires an employer to do more than was done in Dewey, apparently
preferring to leave that question open for future resolution by the EEOC.
This interpretation of the legislative history is in sharp contrast to that of Justice
Marshall in his dissent. See note 72, infra.
35. 432 U.S. at 74-75 & n.9.
36. Id. at 75 n.10. The cases in which no violation was found were: Williams v.
Southern Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959
(1976) (employee's dismissal did not constitute religious discrimination by employer if
he did not regularly ask employee to work on Saturday (employee's Sabbath) but only
133 1
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After looking in vain for helpful rules of law, the Court focused on
the facts of the case. It observed that the court of appeals felt that TWA
had failed to seek reasonable accommodations short of undue hardship,
because the company rejected three alternatives. Its refusal to permit
Hardison to work only four days a week, utilizing an employee on duty
elsewhere; its refusal to bring into work an employee not normally
assigned to that shift as a Saturday substitute; and finally, its refusal to
arrange a swap between another employee and Hardison, made TWA's
conduct violative of the Act. The court of appeals further found that
TWA had not sought, and the union had not entertained, the idea of a
possible variance of the collective-bargaining agreement, and that both
TWA and the union were relying on one another to find a solution, with
the result that neither did anything.
The Supreme Court chose to "disagree with the Court of Appeals
in all relevant respects."3 In giving its reasons, it defined the limits to
which an employer, bound by a collective-bargaining agreement con-
taining a seniority system, must go to reasonably accommodate reli-
gious observances. The three above-mentioned alternatives were re-
jected: the first two would have worked an undue hardship on the com-
pany in the form of undermanning its operations or forcing the em-
asked employee to work a particular Saturday in order to complete a critically impor-
tant project); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976), petition for rehearing denied, 97 S. Ct. 2989 (1977) (em-
ployer's failure to hire not discriminatory where prospective employee, a newspaper
copyreader, refused to work on Saturdays, his Sabbath, and where employer, a news-
paper publisher, required a limited number of copyreaders, who are specialists, to be
available for a six-day workweek); Johnson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 497 F.2d 128 (5th
Cir. 1974) (small postal facility of limited manpower which had hired employee to
work as "part-time flexible clerk" was justified in discharging employee who failed to
show up for work on several Saturdays after making attempts to accommodate em-
ployee's religious practices by allowing him as many Saturdays off as possible and rec-
ommending his transfer to a larger postal facility). The opposite conclusion was reached
in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), affd by an equally
divided court, 97 S. Ct. 342 (1976), judgment vacated and case remanded to the court
of appeals for further consideration in light of TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977),
97 S. Ct. 2965 (1977) (employer held liable for religious discrimination under Title VII
where he discharged employee in response to "mild and infrequent complaints" from
fellow employees forced to substitute on employee's Sabbath); and Riley v. Bendix
Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972) (employee's discharge constituted religious dis-
crimination 'Under Title VII where employer admitted that he had made no effort to
transfer employee to different shift, or to obtain a substitute and, furthermore, that no
actual need for a substitute appeared during employee's Sabbath absences).
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ployer to pay overtime to some employee;8 the last, in which TWA
would have unilaterally arranged a "swap," would have involved an
impermissible breach of the seniority provisions of the contract.3 TWA
had sought to comply with the statutory requirements by holding several
meetings, by accommodating Hardison's observance of his special reli-
gious holidays, by authorizing the union steward to search for someone
who would be willing to swap shifts, and, finally, by attempting (without
success) to find Hardison another job.40 Furthermore, Hardison's supe-
rior at TWA, in meeting with the union's steward, had expressed his
willingness in approving any possible job swaps, but the union official
had stood firmly by the collective-bargaining contract and had been
unwilling to work out a shift or job trade." Thus, in the eyes of the
Supreme Court, TWA had gone as far as it could. Regarding the
collective-bargaining agreement that tied the employer's hands, the
Court remarked: "[It] appears to us that the system itself represented
a significant accommodation to the needs, both religious and secular,
of all TWA employees." 4 According to the Court's finding, TWA, by
working within the framework of the seniority system, had found a
neutral way to minimize the occasions during an employee's working
life when he would be required to work on a day that he wanted to take
off. Furthermore, TWA had reduced its weekend force to a bare mini-
mum in order to complement that goal of the seniority system.43
Having concluded that the seniority system was itself a manifesta-
tion of reasonable accommodation, the Court rationalized its holding
by listing strong public policy and equity arguments. It began by re-
sponding to a Hardison-EEOC contention that compliance with the
statute took precedence over the collective-bargaining contract and the
seniority rights of TWA's other employees. The Court agreed that case
law indicated that neither a collective-bargaining agreement nor a
seniority system could be used to violate the statute." However, the
Court felt that the case supporting that rule, Franks v. Bowman,"
needed to be distinguished from the Hardison issue. In Franks, actual
38. Id. at 76.
39. Id. at 76-77.
40. Id. at 77.
41. Id. at 78.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 79.
45. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). See also note 18, supra.
o
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past discrimination by the employer had already been found, and the
Court had agreed to an abrogation of the seniority system only because
it was necessary to "make whole" the victim of that past discrimination.
The Hardison case was not subject to similar treatment because no dis-
crimination had been found that needed to be corrected. Moreover, the
Court had no intention of finding any discrimination in Hardison's
case:46 "[W]e do not believe that the duty to accommodate requires
TWA to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise valid agreement."4
Thus, the Court, by simply refusing to find discrimination, successfully
evaded the constraints of prior judicial rulings and, consequently, saved
the TWA-IAM collective-bargaining agreement from alteration. Di-
recting its attention to the strong public policy interest to be achieved
by this interpretation, the Court stated:
Collective bargaining, aimed at effecting workable and enforceable agree-
ments between management and labor, lies at the core of our national
labor policy, and seniority provisions are universally included in these
contracts. Without a clear and express indication from Congress, we
cannot agree with Hardison and the EEOC that an agreed-upon seniority
system must give way when necessary to accommodate religious obser-
vances 48
In further support of seniority systems, the Court pointed out that an
employer like TWA allocated work schedules either through involun-
tary assignments or through an equitable seniority system. In the opin-
ion of the Court, to circumvent such a system would be to deny an
innocent employee his contractual rights under the agreement. To favor
Hardison's religious preferences would be to do so only "at the expense
of others who had strong, but perhaps nonreligious reasons for not
working on weekends"; another employee would have been deprived of
his shift preference "at least in part because he did not adhere to a
religion that observed the Saturday Sabbath." 49 The Court summed it
up by finding that
Title VII does not contemplate such unequal treatment. The repeated,
unequivocal emphasis of both the language and the legislative history of
Title VII is on eliminating discrimination in employment, and such dis-
46. 432 U.S. at 79 n.12.
47. Id. at 79.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 81.
10
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crimination is proscribed when it is directed against majorities as well as
minorities.5"
Finally, the Court supported its conclusion by observing that Sec-
tion 703(h)51 of the Act afforded special treatment for seniority systems.
Citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S." and United
Airlines, Inc. v. Evans,53 the Court indicated that the statute signified
50. Id.
51. Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970),
provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compen-
sation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a
bona fide seniority or merit system . . . provided that such differences are not
the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin ...
52. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In this case, it was shown that an employer had violated
Title VII by engaging in discriminatory hiring and promoting practices against black
and Spanish-surnamed persons. Those who could show themselves to be victims of the
company's discrimination after the passage of the Civil Rights Act were rewarded
retroactive seniority relief, but victims of pre-Act discrimination were denied that rem-
edy. In response to that denial, the pre-Act discriminatees alleged that the seniority
system was unlawfully serving to perpetrate the effects of pre-Act discrimination and
that the union's conduct in agreeing to and maintaining a seniority system violated the
Civil Rights Act of 1968. The Court responded by referring to § 703(h) which, it held,
reflected Congress' intent to immunize seniority systems from charges of that nature.
Congress passed 703(h)
to make clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system would
not be unlawful under Title VII. . . . [T]he congressional judgment was that
Title VII should not outlaw the use of existing seniority lists and thereby destroy
or water down the vested seniority rights of employees simply because their
employer had engaged in discrimination prior to the passage of the Act.. . . [A]n
otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under
Title VII simply because it may perpetrate pre-Act discrimination. Congress did
not intend to make it illegal for employees with vested seniority rights to continue
to exercise those rights even at the expense of pre-Act discriminatees.
431 U.S. at 352-54. The opinion further noted that under these circumstances the
seniority system would be seen as discriminatory under Title VII if it could be shown
that (1) its provisions did not apply equally to all races and ethnic groups or (2) it was
formed and operated to perpetrate some illegal purpose. Id. at 355-56.
53. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). Evans was a female flight attendant who was discharged
from United Air Lines in 1968 because she had married. She was rehired in 1972
subsequent to a judicial determination that such practice on the part of airlines was
violative of Title VII. After the rehiring, she filed suit against United when she was
treated for seniority purposes as though she had had no prior service with the company.
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that routine application of a seniority system would not be regarded as
unlawful.54 After referring once again to Franks,5" which held that Sec-
tion 703(h) was a definitional provision and could therefore be relied
upon to demonstrate which employment practices were discriminatory
and which were not,5" the Court declared: "[A]bsent a discriminatory
purpose, the operation of a seniority system cannot be an unlawful
employment practice even if the system has some discriminatory conse-
quences." 57 Adopting this line of reasoning and finding that there had
been "no suggestion of discriminatory intent"5" on the part of either
TWA or the union, the Court ruled that the employer had not discrimi-
nated against Hardison because of his religion. 5 The Court concluded
by stating that, in the absence of what it considered to be clear statutory
language and legislative history to the contrary, it would not construe
Title VII to require an employer "to discriminate against some employ-
ees in order to enable others to observe their Sabbath. '60
Believing that the majority's interpretation of the statute had ac-
tually nullified it, Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan,
filed a lengthy dissent, in which he wrote:
Today's decision deals a fatal blow to all efforts under Title VII to
accommodate work requirements to religious practices. The Court holds,
in essence, that although the EEOC regulations and the Act state that an
employer must make reasonable adjustments in his work demands to take
account of religious observances, the regulation and Act do not really
In rejecting her Title VII claim, the Court pointed to its untimely filing and, signifi-
cantly, to the fact that her attack on the seniority system as discriminatory was insuffi-
ciently drawn. Citing § 703(h), the Court stated:
That section expressly provides that it shall not be an unlawful employment
practice to apply different terms of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority
system, provided that any disparity is not the result of intentional discrimination.
Since respondent does not attack the bona fides of United's seniority system, and
since she makes no charge that the system is intentionally designed to discrimi-
nate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, § 703(h) provides an
additional ground for rejecting her claim.
431 U.S. at 559-60.
54. 432 U.S. at 82.
55. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
56. 432 U.S. at 82.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 83.
60. Id. at 85.
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mean what they say. An employer, the Court concludes, need not grant
even the most minor special privilege to religious observers to enable
them to follow their faith. As a question of social policy, this result is
deeply troubling, for a society that truly values religious pluralism cannot
compel adherents of minority religions to make the cruel choice of surren-
dering their religion or their job."1
First, Marshall urged a common-sense reading of the statutory
language by pointing out that an accommodation issue by its very defi-
nition arises only when some special interest must be allowed special
consideration." The typical pattern appearing in case law is one in which
an employer's neutral rule of general applicability conflicts with a par-
ticular employee's religious practices. The issue is always whether the
employee is to be exempted from the rule's demands.13 To allow such
an exemption, Marshall contended, is to allow its natural consequences,
i.e., "unequal" or "preferential" treatment for the individual involved
and a privilege being "allocated according to religious beliefs." 4 Ac-
cordingly, Marshall found that the statute, by calling for
"accommodations," demanded that Hardison be granted preferential
treatment unless TWA could show that "'undue hardship' would re-
sult." 5
Second, Marshall asserted that the Court seemed "almost oblivious
to the legislative history of the 1972 amendment of Title VII." '6 He
recounted that two employer-favoring decisions, Dewey v. Reynolds
Metal Co. 7 and Riley v. Bendix Corp.,8 rendered shortly after the
promulgation of the 1967 EEOC guidelines,69 questioned whether the
guideline was consistent with Title VII7 Congress, in response to those
questions and wishing to resolve the issue firmly in favor of an em-
ployee's viewpoint, tracked the language of the guideline and unani-
mously passed the 1972 amendment, i.e., Section 2000e(j). Finding the
61. Id. at 86-87.
62. Id. at 87.
63. Id. at 87-88.
64. Id. at 88.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689
(1971).
68. 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
69. See text accompanying note 8, supra.
70. 432 U.S. at 88.
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language of the Court in Hardison to be "strikingly similar" to that in
Dewey7 (which Congress had specifically rejected in its 1972 amend-
ment),72 Marshall concluded that the Court had "follow[ed] the Dewey
decision in direct contravention of congressional intent."73
Third, Marshall criticized the Court's treatment of TWA's conten-
tion that to require it to accommodate Hardison's religious needs would
constitute an establishment of religion contrary to the first amendment
of the Constitution. He noted that the Court, instead of responding to
the Constitutional challenge, simply bypassed it by deciding the case in
such a way as to nullify effectively the problem statute itself. 74 Marshall
then proceeded to defend the constitutionality of Section 701j) as
applied to employment situations fitting the profile of Hardison's. First,
he recognized that valid constitutional questions would be raised if the
statute were interpreted to compel employers to incur substantial expen-
ses to oblige religious observers;75 conversely, if the expenditures were
"de minimis" (as he found the $150 cost of accommodating Hardison's
beliefs to be),7 no constitutional argument could be valid.77 Second, by
71. Id. at 89.
72. Id. Referring to both Dewey (see text accompanying notes 34-35, supra)
and Riley (see text accompanying notes 34-35, supra), Marshall reviewed the legislative
history supporting Section 2000e(j):
These courts reasoned, in language strikingly similar to today's decision, that to
excuse religious observers from neutral work rules would "discriminate against
• . . other employees" and "constitute unequal administration of the collective-
bargaining agreement." Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co. [at 3301. They therefore
refused to equate "religious discrimination with failure to accommodate." Id. at
335. When Congress was reviewing Title VII in 1972, Senator Jennings Randolph
informed the Congress of these decisions which, he said, had "clouded" the
meaning of religious discrimination. 118 Cong. Rec. 706 (1972). He introduced
an amendment, tracking the language of the EEOC regulation, to make clear that
Title VII requires religious accommodation, even though unequal treatment
would result. The primary purpose of the amendment, he explained, was to pro-
tect Saturday Sabbatarians like himself from employers who refuse "to hire or
to continue in employment employees whose religious practices rigidly require
them to abstain from work in the nature of hire on particular days." Id. at 705.
His amendment was unanimously approved by the Senate on a roll call vote, Id.,
at 731. ...
This interpretation of the legislative history is in sharp contrast to that of Justice White,
writing for the majority. See note 34, supra.
73. 432 U.S. at 89.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 90.
76. Id. at 92-93 n.6.
77. Id. at 90.
I t IA
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relying on Wisconsin v. Yoder,"8 Sherbert v. Verner,79 Zorach v.
Clauson,0  Gillette v. United States,81 Welsh v. United States,82
Braunfeld v. Brown,83 and McGowan v. Maryland," Marshall demon-
strated that the Court, on previous occasions, had failed to find estab-
lishment clause problems in exempting religious observers from state-
imposed duties, 5 and contended, finally, that logic dictated a similar
holding with regard to duties owed a private employer."
Finally, Marshall narrowed his analysis to an examination of the
facts and a determination of whether TWA had met its burden of ex-
hausting all reasonable accommodations short of "undue hardship" to
its business. He concluded that it had not. 7 He rejected the Court's
conclusion that compelling the company to assume the costs of overtime
pay or replacing Hardison during his Sabbath would have resulted in
"undue hardship.""8 The record indicated that an accommodation
78. 406 U.S. 205, 234-35, n.22 (1972) (two Amish children, aged 14 and 15, who
had completed eighth grade, were exempted from state compulsory school attendance
law requiring all children to attend school until the age of 16).
79. 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (Seventh-Day Adventist whose religion prohibited
Saturday employment and who had rejected job offers for Saturday work was allowed
to collect state unemployment compensation benefits even though state law, regarding
benefits explicitly rendered ineligible any person who failed to accept work offered to
him).
80. 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (city program permitting public schools to release and
excuse from class attendance certain students so that they could go to religious centers
for religious instruction was found to be constitutional with regard to the establishment
clause).
81. 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (section of Military Selective Service Act of 1967 which
provided exemption from military service to conscientious objectors to all war was not
violative of the establishment clause).
82. 398 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1970) (draft registrant who held "with the strength of
more traditional religious convictions" strong beliefs opposing the taking of human life
was exempted from military service).
83. 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing law proscribing Sunday retail sale of
certain enumerated commodities upheld after Court rejected contention that the statute
was law respecting establishment of religion and therefore violative of the first amend-
ment).
84. 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (convictions of store em-
ployees who had made retail sales on a Sunday in violation of the state Sunday closing
laws were upheld after the Court rejected the argument that the statute violated the
establishment clause).
85. 432 U.S. at 90.
86. Id. at 91.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 92.
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would have been necessary for a three-month period, at the end of which
Hardison could have transferred back to his old building, where his
seniority would have been reinstated.89 The costs for an arrangement
over that time period would have been $150,11 a sum which Marshall, in
contrast to the Court, found compatible with the purpose of the statute.
Marshall also took aim at TWA for its failure to seek out actively
an employee who would have been willing to trade shifts with Hardi-
son.9 The reason for that failure was denounced by Marshall (although
clearly accepted by the Court): any trade, whether voluntary or not,
would have violated the collective-bargaining agreement which author-
ized only transfers to vacant jobs.9 In addition to the possibility of a
voluntary trade, Marshall proposed two other options that he believed
would have satisfied the statutory requirements. The first was that TWA
could have paid overtime to a voluntary replacement and passed on the
cost to Hardison, who would earn it by working overtime at regular
pay. 3 The second option would have called for TWA to transfer Hardi-
son immediately back to his previous department in Building 1, where
he had attained sufficient seniority. 4 Marshall fully recognized that
both solutions would have abrogated the collective-bargaining contract:
the first, because of a provision directing that any employee who worked
overtime was to receive premium pay; and the second because the agree-
ment prohibited employees from transferring more often than once
every six months.95 However, he inferred that the statute required resort
to such options, arguing that neither of them would have deprived any
other employee of his rights under the agreement or violated seniority
expectations of others.96 Furthermore, although he conceded that both
solutions would cause some administrative inconvenience to TWA, he
argued that such a burden would not make the statute violative of the
establishment clause.97 The Court, he stressed, on numerous previous
occasions, had approved of exemptions from state-imposed duties that
placed "not inconsiderable burdens on private parties."" Citing
89. Id. at 92-93 n.6.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 93-94.
92. Id. at 94 n.10.
93. Id. at 95.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 95-96.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 96 n.13.
98. Id.
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Selective Draft Law Cases,99 an old decision with recent implications,
he attempted to buttress his argument that the statute did not violate
the Constitution merely because it gave preferential treatment to Hardi-
son. That case held that to excuse conscientious objectors (whose rea-
sons for objecting were religious in nature) from military service during
time of war forces non-objectors to serve in their place, but that such
exemptions would in no way cause a violation of the establishment
clause.10° Certainly, Hardison's desire to be excused from work one day
a week at the expense of his fellow employees could not, in Marshall's
opinion, be as radical a proposal as being excused from combat duty at
the expense of one's fellow citizens. Marshall also cited Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Market,' which upheld a law prohibiting private citi-
zens from engaging in certain activities within fixed distances from
places of worship, to support his contention that the law often discrimi-
nates against private parties to uphold special religious interests.0 2
One unpursued avenue of relief that Marshall mentioned, but sur-
prisingly did not emphasize, was that TWA could have brought Hardi-
son's problem before the Union Relief Committee after realizing that
Hardison had made no attempt to do so himself."°3 Marshall noted that
the record indicated that the function of the Committee was to alleviate
problems caused by the seniority system, and that it had at least on one
occasion arranged for a permanent transfer outside the seniority sys-
tem. 04
In his conclusion, Marshall called the decision a tragedy-not
99. 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1918).
100. Id. at 389-90.
101. 366 U.S. 617, 627 (1961).
102. 432 U.S. at 96 n.13. Although they seem impressive, these two cases do not
supply the persuasive argument in favor of Hardison that Marshall hoped they would
because the essential component that determined their outcome was lacking in Hardi-
son's case. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), the Court indicated why
it has respected the interests of conscientious objectors: it is for the "valid secular"
reason that it is hopeless to try to transform such individuals into effective fighting men.
Id. at 453. With regard to laws that restrict certain activities on Sundays, the Gallagher
case revealed the judicial attitude by citing, at 630, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 450 (1961), which upheld Sunday closing laws because they serve the "legitimate
secular interest" of the State, not to aid religion, but to provide one day a week for
people to rest, recreate, and recuperate. In Hardison, there was a marked absence of a
"valid secular" purpose behind § 701(0). It was the absence of such a purpose that led
the Court to its refusal to enforce the statute.
103. 432 U.S. at 94 n.10.
104. Id.
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merely because one employee had been deprived of his livelihood for
following the dictates of his conscience, but because of the impact the
case would have on "thousands of Americans like Hardison who could
be forced to live on welfare as the price they must pay for worshipping
their God."' 5
The Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
nullified Section 701(j) of the Act, i.e., the duty to make "reasonable
accommodations" short of "undue hardship," without finding it uncon-
stitutional. The Court accomplished this by merely refusing to enforce
the law. Paradoxical as this decision might at first appear to be, it is
perhaps understandable. Mr. Justice Marshall, in his two-pronged ex-
amination of the statutory language' 0 and the legislative history, 07
argued convincingly that the only way to reconcile the statute and the
facts in Hardison's situation would have been to find that TWA had not
attempted to meet its duty of accommodation, and that it should, there-
fore, be required to take steps to do so. Marshall, however, overlooked
a crucial factor that the Court recognized: the duty to consider and
weigh the competing equities.' In Hardison's case, to apply a statute
that called for accommodation on the part of the employer would have
resulted in an accommodation by Hardison's fellow employees. Except
for the payment of premium wages by TWA, none of the proposed
accommodations would have had the slightest impact on the employer,
but they would have been fundamentally unfair to the other employees.
To erode the expectations of many blameless workers, whose rights
were based solely on satisfactory and often long service, would have
been to ignore the practical realities and necessities of the business
world.
Another justification for the Court's refusal to permit TWA to
violate the agreement with the union is historical. At one time, employ-
ers were free to ignore the interests of their employees, if they so
chose. 09 Subsequently, the emergence of a strong labor movement in
105. 432 U.S. at 96-97.
106. See text accompanying notes 62-65, supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 66-73, supra.
108. 432 U.S. at 79-81.
109. See H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS (1968), where the
author notes in the introduction:
Until the fourth decade of this century, American workers often fought govern-
ment as well as employers in their efforts to unionize. While there were earlier
beginnings, it was in the 1930's that government changed sides and began to foster
18
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this country successfully raised the public's conscience regarding the
inequality of bargaining power between labor and management. Con-
gress' reaction to this situation was the passage of legislation"" which
placed pre-eminence upon unionization and the collective-bargaining
agreement. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that the Court in Hardison
chose not to undermine the integrity of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment and its seniority system.
But how this decision came about is not as significant as how far
it will extend. Indeed, its application is more universal than its narrow
holding that a collective-bargaining agreement's seniority system is not
required to yield to an accommodation of a particular employee's reli-
gious observances. As Marshall predicted, members of minority reli-
gions' whose rights are unprotected by typical collective-bargaining
agreements are in at least theoretical danger of losing their jobs.I, Even
in the absence of a union contract governing work-scheduling at a busi-
ness, an employee observing the dictates of his religion will be entitled
to no accommodation by his employer if the employer merely speculates
that to accommodate him would cause a minor morale problem among
the other employees. The language of the decision, which is at total
collective bargaining as a method for solving such problems as ...working
conditions. . . and the psychological frustration of the modern worker. Since the
thirties, collective bargaining has come to occupy a position at the center of
national labor policy.
Wellington further contends that the courts stalwartly blocked the tides of reform
legislation favoring unionization and employee bargaining power, by citing Final Report
of the Commission on Industrial Relations, S. Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., I,
38-61 (1916); F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (New York,
Macmillan, 1930), note 29 at 52053 n.19: "The growth and development of unions and
of collective-bargaining was wrongly impeded, the courts were rightly viewed as instru-
ments of the employer class. . . ." H. WELLINGTON at 26.
110. National Labor Relations Act, c. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 151-68 (1970)).
111. Senator Jennings Randolph, in introducing Section 2000eo) as an amend-
ment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, stated:
There are approximately 750,000 men and women who are Orthodox Jews in the
U.S. work force. . . .There are an additional 425,000 men and women in the
work force who are Seventh-Day Adventists. There are . . .5,000 individuals
within [the Seventh-Day Baptists] . . .denomination in the work force.
118 CONG. REc. 705 (1972). This enumeration, of course, represents only a partial
estimation of the number of persons whose jobs can be adversely affected by the decision
in Hardison.
112. 432 U.S. at 96-97.
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variance with the language of the statute, indicates that, at least in the
area of religious needs, if the rights of the majority are even indirectly
adversely affected, the rights of the minority must yield.13
At a time when white males are filing reverse discrimination cases
against minority-weighted admissions practices in law"4 and medical"-
schools and are questioning the right of women and racial minorities to
receive improved job and educational opportunities which are not made
available to white males-e.g., "affirmative action"-the Hardison de-
cision must not be overlooked. The basic issue in all these cases, which
will ultimately mold our society, is the same issue that was decided in
Hardison: To what extent can the law be applied to give preference to
the rights of a minority group member over the rights of the majority?
Hardison established that, absent a valid secular purpose supporting a
statute designed to implement an individual's religious freedom, the
rights of the minority will be subordinated to the rights of the majority
if the latter's interests are affected. The reverse discrimination cases
mentioned above do not, of course, deal with statutes that lack valid
secular purpose"' and, in that sense, they can be distinguished from
Hardison. However, the rationale behind the Hardison opinion demon-
strates that the Court is sensitive to the plight of white males who claim
that their validly earned expectations of success in the fields of higher
education and employment are being thwarted by "affirmative action."
Their plight is not very different from that of Hardison's fellow employ-
ees at TWA who had labored diligently to attain their position in the
seniority hierarchy. How the Court will ultimately resolve the reverse
discrimination cases remains to be seen, but it is evident that preferen-
tial treatment for minorities to the exclusion of the majority is not an
attractive proposition in the eyes of an equity-minded Supreme Court.
Marilyn R. Schwartz
113. See note 102, supra.
114. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
115. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1977), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977).
116. The purpose of the "affirmative action" programs is to accomplish the
integration of minority groups into the working force, the professions, and society as a
whole. See 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1977) (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting).
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